Draffen v. Black--The State\u27s Power to Regulate Fishing in Private Ponds by Mann, Arnett
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 36 | Issue 2 Article 7
1948
Draffen v. Black--The State's Power to Regulate
Fishing in Private Ponds
Arnett Mann
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mann, Arnett (1948) "Draffen v. Black--The State's Power to Regulate Fishing in Private Ponds," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 36 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol36/iss2/7
DRAFFEN v. BLACK-THE STATE'S POWER TO REGULATE
FISHING IN PRIVATE PONDS
The owner of a tract of land had thereon a large fishing pond
which has no inlet, outlet or connection with public waters. On
payment of a fee he permitted members of the public to fish in
the pond. A state conservation officer entered upon the-property
to determine whether persons fishing in the pond had state licenses
to do so, and whether the fish taken from the pond were of the
size and number permitted by statute. The owner of the pond pro-
tested this action of the° officer on the grounds that the fish were
private property, that the statutes did not apply to them, and that
the officer had no -right to enter upon his land without his
permussion.
As a consequence of this controversy, the officer and others
brought an action for a declaration of the rights of the parties. The
chancellor decreed that a license was not required of any person
fishing in such a pond, that the statute imposing a limit on the
number and size of fish withdrawn from waters, or in possession,
did not apply to fish taken from a pond unconnected with a public
stream. The chancellor -was also of the opnion that, under the
circumstances, conservation officers had no right to go upon the
defendant's 'property
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in the case of Draffen v. Black,1
reversed the chancellor's decree, basing its decision on a statute
which prohibits any person from having in his possession fish above
a specified number or below a specified size, and upon another
statute requiring a license to fish in waters public or private.'
Any discussion as to the soundness of this decision would be
incomplete if not futile, without first mquirmg into the nature of
the property interests, public and private, in fish. Fish are considered
animals ferae naturae, when migratory, and belong to the public.'
This public ownership is probably based on the fact that all the
people are potential actual possessors through possible capture of
the fish and yet none are actual possessors when the fish are free.
Too, the land forming the beds of waters within which the fish
exist, propagate and run, is owned by the people. Furthermore, as
fish are desirablq as property, it is convenient to have ownership
vested somewhere. Ownership, not existing in individuals because
'302 Ky. 775, 196 S.W 2d 362 (1946).
-Ky. R. S. (1946) 150.470.
'Ky. R. S. (1946) 150.170.
4Ex parte Fritz, 86 Miss. 210, 38 So. 722 (1905) State v. Hume,
52 Ore. 1, 95 Pac. 808 (1908)
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fish are migratory and not in individual possession and control, is
logically placed in the people as a whole. Though it has been stated
that title is in the state,' this is probably erroneous.0
Though fish when free belong to the public, an individual may
have a qualified property right in them, and when reduced to pos-
session, a property right that may be the subject of larceny.' Logi-
cally, then, fish are deemed private property when confined in
waters completely enclosed within private land. The reason is clear.
Such fish cannot pass to and from public waters and are therefore
correctly considered as having been reduced to possession. The
principle is well expressed in the case of State V. Lzpznske:
"Whether a land owner propagates fish in a glass bowl, a water
tank, or a pond, such fish are not wild so long as they have no con-
nection with navigable waters and so long as they are subject to the
dominion and control of the owner." I So to consider fish in en-
closed waters as private property because reduced to possession, is
logical. An analogy to a similar property interest will make this
apparent. The owner of a bee tree on his land owns the bees in the
tree, for he has control of them by virtue of the fact that he may cut
the tree and take them."1 Similarly, the owner of a private pond
may drain it any time he wishes if it has no connection with public
waters, and though time may elapse before he does so, the fish
cannot escape. Undoubtedly, therefore, the owner of the pond in
the present case owned the fish therein.
This being true, it is pertinent to inquire whether the court could
reasonably have, and should have, avoided constitutional questions
by holding that the statutes were inapplicable in this case. As the
court pointed out, the purpose of fish and game laws is to conserve
wild life for the benefit of the public. But the public can have no
interest in fish absolutely confined in a private pond. The public
cannot go upon the land of the owner of the pond to fish therein, and
the fish will not migrate to public waters. Therefore, the public has
no legal concern in the preservation of such fish.
Another ground upon which the statutes in this case could have
been held inapplicable is that the Act as a whole does not reveal the
intention to regulate private ponds having no passageways with
IReid v. Ross, 46 S.W 2d 567, 568 (Mo. 1932).
6BRowN, LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (Ist ed. 1936) sec. 6.
People v. Bridges, 142 Ill. 30, 31 N.E. 115 (1892).
State v Shaw, 67 Ohio St. 157, 65 N.E. 875 (1902)
'Ark. Game & Fish Comm. v. Storthz, 181 Ark. 1089, 29 S.W 2d
294 (1930), Newman v. Ardmore Rod & Gun Club, 190 Okla. 470, 125
P 2d 191 (1942) Jones v State, 119 Tex. Cr. Rep. 126, 45 S.W 2d
612 (1932), State v. Lipmske, 212 Wis. 421, 249 N.W 289 (1933)-
see Ex parte Fritz, 86 Miss. 210, 38 So. 722, 723 (1905) State v.
Roberts, 59 N.H. 484, 486 (1879).
" 212 Wis. 421, 249 N.W 289, 291 (1933)
"2 COOLEY, TORTS (3rd ed. 1906) 838.
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public waters. It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that
provisions of an act are to be construed together." Yet the court
did not note that another section of the Act, prohibiting fishing ex-
cept by angling, and fishing from May first to May twenty-ninth,
except with a pole and line, applied only to public waters." Also,
the court might well have observed that the statute prohibiting the
placing of injurious substances and explosives in public waters,"
made no mention of bodies of water entirely enclosed within private
property. If the legislature had intended to regulate such bodies of
water, it would seem that these statutes would have included them.
Of course, it may be argued and, it is admitted, not without
reason, that the court was correct in applying the language of the
statutes literally and could not avoid finding them applicable. The
fact remains that courts take into account the inabilities of mankind
to express clearly what it intends. And the spirit and not the letter
of the law is applied.' In Jones v. State.n an indictment was brought
under an article of the Texas Penal Code, similar to the Kentucky
statute on possession, of fish. Though the article made possession of
fish of a certain size or number illegal, and mentioned neither public
nor private waters, the defendant was adjudged not guilty solely on
the ground that the article did not apply to private ponds. This
conclusion was reached by construing articles together, one of which
exempted private ponds. In State v. Lowder,' the defendants were
being tried for seing in a pond contrary to a statute, though
private ponds were exempted. The statute was held to have been
violated and the court decided that the pond within which the de-
fendants seined was not a private pond for the reason that it over-
flowed. Yet the pond was not public property because it was upon
private property. The result reached was proper. The pond was sub-
ject to overflow and the fish therein belonged to the people and
came within the scope of conservation.
Two other cases will further show that courts do not interpret
statutory language literally but rather make the purpose of the fish
conservation laws the determining factor. In People v. Conrad,' the
defendant had been convicted by the lower court of spearing fish
contrary to the statute. Though the statute prohibited spearing in
"any of the inland lakes in this state," and the defendant had
"Commonwealth v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 210 Ky.
324, 275 S.W 795 (1925) Ashland Iron & Mining Co. v Fowler, 208
Ky. 422, 271 S.W 589 (1924).
"Ky. R. S. (1946) 150.440.
-KY. R. S. (1946) 150.460.
'Dougherty v. Ky Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd., 279 Ky. 262, 30
S.W 2d 756 (1939), Commonwealth v. Fenley, 189 Ky 480, 225 S.W
154 (1920), Neutzel v. Ryans, 184 Ky. 292, 211 S.W 852 (1919) Sams
v. Sams' Adm'r., 85 Ky. 396, 3 S.W 593 (1887).
"119 Tex. Cr. Rep. 126, 45 S.W 2d 612 (1932).
'7198 Ind. 234, 153 N.E. 399 (1926).
125 Mich. 1, 83 N.W 1012 (1900)
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speared fish in an inland lake in the state, the conviction was re-
versed. The statute was held inapplicable in this case because the
lake had no inlet or outlet, and the court concluded the public had
no interest in the protection of fish in such a lake. But in People v.
Horing," the court affirmed a conviction obtained under the same
statute, basing its decision on the fact that the fish in the lake from
which defendants fished could migrate to public waters.
Let us assume, however, for the purpose of discussion, that the
court in the case of Draffen v. Black correctly construed the statutes
therein as applicable to a private pond with no inlet or outlet. This
raises the question of whether the court was correct in holding the
statutes within the constitutional exercise of the state's police power.
This question of the state's right to regulate fishing in a body
of water entirely on private land and having no passageway for
fish to pass to and from public waters, is a novel one, heretofore not
passed upon by a Kentucky court, and upon which there is a dearth
of decisions in other jurisdictions.
That fish, as animals ferae naturae, in whose preservation the
public has an interest, are proper subjects of state regulation under
its police power, is well settled. -' It is likewise well settled, though
judicial opinion is scarce on the subject, that since the public has no
interest in non-migratory fish, the state's police power does not ex-
tend to them and bodies of water wholly enclosed on private land
are not subject to regulations.' The determining factor in deciding
whether a regulation may apply to a body of water on private land
is not whether such a body of water is private property, but whether
it affords a means for fish to pass to and from public waters.- The
conclusion is inescapable that the police power does not extend to
the preservation of fish within "land locked" bodies of water.
However, this fundamental aspect of the case was ignored by the
court. Rather, the decision was made to turn on the issue of the
right of the state to subject property to state regulation in order to
enforce the law in respect to public property. The court stated: "If,
137 Mich. 406, 100 N.W 691 (1904).
People v Bridges, 142 Ill. 30, 31 N.E. 115 .(1892), People v.
Horling, 137 Mich. 406, 100 N.W 691 (1904) People v. Collison, 85
Mich. 105, 48 N.W 292 (1891), State v. Hume, 52 Ore. 1, 95 Pac. 808
(1908)
'People v. Conrad, 125 Mich. 1, 83 N.W 1012 (1900), Newman
v. Ardmore Rod & Gun Club, 190 Okla. 470, 125 P 2d 191 (1942)
see People v. Lewis, 227 Mich. 343, 198 N.W 957, 958 (1924), State
v. Roberts, 59 N.H. 484, 486 (1879), Jones v. State, 119 Tex. Cr. Rep.
126, 45 S.W 2d 612, 614 (1932).
'State v Lowder, 198 Ind. 234, 153 N.E. 399 (1926), People v.
Horling, 137 Mich. 406, 100 N.W 691 (1904), People v. Conrad, 125
Mich. 1, 83 N.W 1012 (1900), People v. Doxtater, 27 N.Y. Supp. 481
(1894), State v. Lipinske, 212 Wis. 421, 249 N.W 289 (1933) see
Taylor Fishing Club v Hammett, 88 S.W 2d 127, 130 (Tex. 1935).
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to enforce the law in respect to public property, it becomes neces-
sary to regulate private property, such may be done by the state in
the exercise of its police power "' The argument, upon the
strength of which the correctness of the decision rests, was advanced
that to exempt private ponds from the statute would destroy its
force. Said the court: "At once it is apparent that the Fish and Game
Commission would be helpless in its endeavor to prohibit the taking
of excessive numbers or undersized fish from public streams, if one
could retain in his possession all fish taken from private ponds,
irrespective of their size and number; because, in penal actions to
enforce the game laws, the Commonwealth would be required to
prove the contraband in possession of an angler was taken from a
public stream, and not from private waters." ' This is a rather flimsy
argument upon which to justify an interference with private rights.
Mere possession of fish not conforming to statutory requirements
could well create a presumption of illegal possession. This would
cast the burden on the defendant of proving that he did not take the
fish from public waters but from a legal source such as a private
pond. Indeed, it is as illogical as it is novel, to argue that a statute
though not expressly doing so, was intended to and could legally
create an offense because of the difficulty of proving another. Rather
than interfere with private rights, let the legislature meet this sup-
posed difficulty by making possession of fish coming within the
statutory restrictions as to size and number, prima facie evidence
that they were taken illegally.
Additional fallacious reasoning was employed by the court when
it stated that the legislature was not interfering with private rights
in respect to the fish in the pond, but was only regulating the public
invited to fish therein. "Ownership, or the right of property is, .,
not a single, indivisible concept, but a collection or bundle of
rights "I And one of the elements of ownership is the power to
confer upon others an interest in the property owned. Though the
legislature has not taken the fish, property of the owner of the pona,
it prevents him from disposing of them below a certain size or above
a certain number to possible buyers by giving them the right to fish
in the pond. Too, a restriction is placed on alienation in that only
licensed individuals can buy from the pond owner the right to take
fish from his pond. Further, the legislature in effect has authorized
officers of the state to go on private property, an interference with
the possession and enjoyment thereof by the owner.
These invasions of private rights could possibly be denominated
a taking, though the corpus of the property remain with the owner.
'Draffen v, Black, 302 Ky. 775, 778, 196 S.W 2d 362, 364 (1946).
'Draffen v Black, 302 Ky. 775, 777, 169 S.W 2d 362, 363 (1946).
SBRowx, LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (lst ed. 1936) sec. 5.
Ibzd.
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Indeed, the line between eminent domain and police power has been
recognized as one of degree and the test of reasonableness is said to
be the only barrier to uncompensated regulation.' Assuming, how-
ever, that only a question of police power is involved, it is the
opinion of this writer that in the present case, accepting the court's
view that the statutes were meant to be regulative of bodies of
water wholly enclosed on private property, the state has transcended
its constitutional power. Though the purpose of a regulation be a
valid one, the regulation itself may be unconstitutional if it is not
reasonable.' As shown previously in this note, little if any public
good is accomplished by such regulations as applied to private ponds,
and as there is no necessity for their application in this case, they
constitute unreasonable invasions of personal and private property
rights.
In conclusion, it seems justifiable to say that the decision is
erroneous. The court should have construed the statutes as map-
plicable in this case. Assuming, however, that the statutes were ap-
plicable, they should have been declared unconstitutional in so far as
they apply to fishing in bodies of water wholly enclosed within
private property
ARNETT MANN
'Note (1935) 35 COL. L. R. 938, 939.
"Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 49 S. Ct. 57 (1928),
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277"U.S. 183, 48 S. Ct. 447 (1928), Weaver v.
Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402, 46 S. Ct. 320 (1926), Burns Baking
Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 304, 44 S. Ct. 412 (1924) Mallonee, "Police
Regulations"-Essentials of Unconstitutionality (1917) 51 Aim. L. R.
187, 188.
